Discussion of estate agent and owners relationship in estate management in the frames of the principle agent theory

碩士 === 中國科技大學 === 建築研究所 === 97 === Under a high degree of economic development, the nation’s building types and property ownership has gone through drastic changes. It is transforming form a free market management to contracted property management. New problems arise through the interaction between...

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Main Authors: TENG MU JUNG, 鄧睦融
Other Authors: 吳韻吾
Format: Others
Language:zh-TW
Published: 2009
Online Access:http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/34196428327521922231
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spelling ndltd-TW-097CKIT02220072015-10-13T13:11:49Z http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/34196428327521922231 Discussion of estate agent and owners relationship in estate management in the frames of the principle agent theory 以委託代理理論探討物業管理運作機制中物業關係人互動問題之研究 TENG MU JUNG 鄧睦融 碩士 中國科技大學 建築研究所 97 Under a high degree of economic development, the nation’s building types and property ownership has gone through drastic changes. It is transforming form a free market management to contracted property management. New problems arise through the interaction between the property owners and their contract property managers, influencing the quality of the estate managed. Through literature review, interviews and questionnaires, the information was investigated through factor analysis to determine the mechanism of property management. Much of the source problem we found arise from disparity in information between the property owners and their managing organization. From this study a system of management can be devised to address these problems. 1. Contracting managing firms behavior can be divided into 5 major categories: adverse selection, moral hazards through hidden action and knowledge, mis-signaling and screening information. Statistically 91.4 % of interviewees feel the agent hides their inadequacies, while 92.6% feels the agent may withhold unfavorable information, 90.6% feels the agents are lazy and through misinformation to find the owners bottom limit at 88%. 2. A management mechanism to control the agents are from participation constraint, incentive compatibility, supervision, marketing and reputation as 5 means to reduce the mentioned problems. Statistically the interviewee see a complete and clear contract to be essential at92%, 82.4% feels an incentive through bonus and commission, 82% would agree to renewing contracts, 91.4% feels the need for firm reputation and 87.4% feels the quality of service can be further improved through market competition. This study brings forth current problems in property management as well as some suggestions for improving the current property management mechanism. We hope it will provide useful information to the industry. 吳韻吾 2009 學位論文 ; thesis 0 zh-TW
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language zh-TW
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description 碩士 === 中國科技大學 === 建築研究所 === 97 === Under a high degree of economic development, the nation’s building types and property ownership has gone through drastic changes. It is transforming form a free market management to contracted property management. New problems arise through the interaction between the property owners and their contract property managers, influencing the quality of the estate managed. Through literature review, interviews and questionnaires, the information was investigated through factor analysis to determine the mechanism of property management. Much of the source problem we found arise from disparity in information between the property owners and their managing organization. From this study a system of management can be devised to address these problems. 1. Contracting managing firms behavior can be divided into 5 major categories: adverse selection, moral hazards through hidden action and knowledge, mis-signaling and screening information. Statistically 91.4 % of interviewees feel the agent hides their inadequacies, while 92.6% feels the agent may withhold unfavorable information, 90.6% feels the agents are lazy and through misinformation to find the owners bottom limit at 88%. 2. A management mechanism to control the agents are from participation constraint, incentive compatibility, supervision, marketing and reputation as 5 means to reduce the mentioned problems. Statistically the interviewee see a complete and clear contract to be essential at92%, 82.4% feels an incentive through bonus and commission, 82% would agree to renewing contracts, 91.4% feels the need for firm reputation and 87.4% feels the quality of service can be further improved through market competition. This study brings forth current problems in property management as well as some suggestions for improving the current property management mechanism. We hope it will provide useful information to the industry.
author2 吳韻吾
author_facet 吳韻吾
TENG MU JUNG
鄧睦融
author TENG MU JUNG
鄧睦融
spellingShingle TENG MU JUNG
鄧睦融
Discussion of estate agent and owners relationship in estate management in the frames of the principle agent theory
author_sort TENG MU JUNG
title Discussion of estate agent and owners relationship in estate management in the frames of the principle agent theory
title_short Discussion of estate agent and owners relationship in estate management in the frames of the principle agent theory
title_full Discussion of estate agent and owners relationship in estate management in the frames of the principle agent theory
title_fullStr Discussion of estate agent and owners relationship in estate management in the frames of the principle agent theory
title_full_unstemmed Discussion of estate agent and owners relationship in estate management in the frames of the principle agent theory
title_sort discussion of estate agent and owners relationship in estate management in the frames of the principle agent theory
publishDate 2009
url http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/34196428327521922231
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