| Summary: | 碩士 === 國立中正大學 === 資訊工程所 === 97 === A multi-hop wireless backhaul network has the unique advantage of providing extended coverage to wireless areas or areas with little existing wired infrastructure. Traffic from mobile users to the wired Internet, and vice versa, is processed through multiple wireless Transit Access Points (TAPs) via a gateway. However, under current MAC operations, users located several hops away from the gateway suffer from low throughput, and even starvation in some cases. Moreover, if the nodes (i.e., TAPs and the gateway) in the wireless backhaul networks are selfish due to belonging to different independent entities, the traffic destined for different TAPs also suffer from seriously fairness problem. So far, very few efforts have been made to solve the fairness problem in wireless backhaul networks with selfish nodes.
In this thesis, we first study the fairness problem for downlink traffic in multi-hop wireless backhaul networks with selfish nodes. Unlike the transmission of uplink traffic in which transit packets are dropped at intermediate TAPs, almost downlink link traffic is dropped at the gateway. Therefore, we design an incentive-based mechanism in which the optimal strategies of selfish TAPs and the gateway are the corresponding actions to enforce the fairness model. Then, we consider both uplink and downlink traffic in the wireless backhaul networks. The fairness problem for bidirectional traffic is more complexity since it has the characteristics of both uplink and downlink traffic. So, we propose new incentive mechanism to enforce the bidirectional fairness in the wireless backhaul networks. We also prove that our mechanism is correct and truthful (i.e., selfish TAPs and gateway have no incentive to cheat or collude). Therefore, even if an agent has multiple TAPs in the same wireless backhaul network, our mechanism still can work as expected.
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