The Impact of Management Reliabilityand Corporate Governance on Stock Price

• Main Authors: Chia-Chiang Chang, 張家將
• Other Authors: Jiu-Young Jian
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2008
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/53102004891147989688

碩士 === 雲林科技大學 === 會計系研究所 === 96 === Accounting information is an important information for capital market, and the voluntary earnings forecast is the general medium for management communication with external investors. But the effect of communication must establish in the foundation of external investors’ trust. Investors not only care management’s earnings forecast but whether the management’s reputation is reliable. This study investigates the relationship between management’s reliability and stock price. In recent years, the SEC in order to improve the stock market structure except for the enhancement of corporate information exposition standard , carried out corporate governance positively. Good accounting information are produced in the good corporate governance company; otherwise, distorts bad accounting information, means the corporate governance has problems. And this study’s another purpose is to investigate the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms on management’s reliability and stock price. In this research, the accuracy of voluntary earnings forecast is used as a proxy variable for management’s reputation and use the percentage of the shares of directors and supervisors and chairman also served as general manager to evaluate corporate governance. The empirical results indicate that the more accuracy of voluntary earnings forecast , the abnormal price response is bigger in the market. It demonstrates that management’s reliability and abnormal returns in the stock market is significantly positive. And the results on corporate governance are as follows: 一、When chairman not served as general manager, the empirical results are significantly positive. It shows that good corporate governance can enhance management’s reliability. And when the management’s reputation is reliable, it’s announced information also has information content. 二、In the aspect of shares of directors and supervisors, the empirical result is significantly but is actually opposite with the hypothesis anticipated direction. The reasons possibly are based on the manager’s self-interest motivation , our family business and the adventure atmosphere in the stock market. The bad corporate governance company possibly use announcement and the renewal of the financial forecast to achieve it’s self-interest motivation.