Managerial Incentives, Dividend Policy and Risk-Taking.
碩士 === 淡江大學 === 會計學系碩士班 === 96 === Prior studies consider how agency problems influence managerial investment decisions. Agency problems could lead managers either into overinvestment or underinvestment. In addition, some empirical studies have investigated the impact of managerial incentive compens...
Main Authors: | Jen-Shin Chen, 陳仁信 |
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Other Authors: | Yu-Shun Hung |
Format: | Others |
Language: | zh-TW |
Published: |
2008
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Online Access: | http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/95235691139138067318 |
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