Directors and Monitors’ Remunerations Research

• Main Authors: Yu-Chen Chang, 張又臻
• Other Authors: Yu-Hui Su
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2008
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/v3th5k

碩士 === 東吳大學 === 會計學系 === 96 === We use a bargaining framework to examine the relations between agency conflicts and the scale and composition of directors and monitors’ remunerations. We consider that when agency conflicts of corporations are serious, controlling owners use their control force to influence directors and monitors’ remunerations and encroach on the minority shareholders’ interests to make the maximum of their interests. Therefore, when agency conflicts of corporations are serious, the scale of their directors and monitors’ remunerations are bigger. In addition, the composition of directors and monitors’ remunerations has cash and stocks. In opposition to cash, the stock price influences the scale of their directors and monitors’ remunerations. Therefore, we consider that when agency conflicts of corporations are serious, their stock price is lower and controlling owners hope to receive cash, so the composition of directors and monitors’ remunerations has more cash. Our samples from 2004 to 2006 are listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange or Gretai Securities Markets. Our evidence suggests that the scale and composition of directors and monitors’ remunerations are influenced by agency problems. First, when agency conflicts of corporations are serious, the scale of their directors and monitors’ remunerations are bigger. Second, when agency conflicts of corporations are serious, the composition of directors and monitors’ remunerations has more cash.