| Summary: | 碩士 === 東吳大學 === 政治學系 === 96 === This thesis aims to test whether Downs’ “Spatial Theory of Competition” and “Median Voter Theorem“ can be used to explain the competition strategy of the main parties in Taiwan from 2000 to 2008. The result of this research indicates that DPP’s policy on the TI-UM issue (Taiwan independence versus unification with the Mainland China) presents basically a ”Centrifugal-Competition” tendency. After the Legislature Election in 2001, DDP held a pro-left position in the TI-UM issue at the beginning, then continuously move to the left on the political spectrum.Although, the position moved back slightly to right after DPP lost the Legislature Election in 2008. The DPP’s strategy during this period is actually contradictory to Downs’ Median Voter Theorem. On the contrary, KMT’s policy on the TI-UM issue presents basically a “Centripetal Competition” tendency. After the President Election in 2001, KMT retreat to a more pro-right position on the TI-UM issue for a short while, then move to a more centripetal position from late 2001 to 2008. The KMT’s strategy during this period still confirms Downs’ Median Voter Theorem. This research provides both confirming and disconforming examples to Downs’ theory. Downs’ theory assumes that a party’s main and only goal is to “win” in elections, therefore, in order to win over the majority of voters in the middle, parties should adopt “Centripetal Competition” strategy. But, in fact, the factors of “factions,” ”ideology,” “leadership,” and “the electoral systems” also affect the competition strategies of a party, thus sometimes, diminish the explanability of Donws’ theory, even produce deviant cases.
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