The study of Relationship between Corporate Governance Variables and Operating Performance in Taiwan Semiconductor Industry

碩士 === 實踐大學 === 財務金融與保險研究所 === 96 === In recent years, corporate governance in the practical realm and the academic realm all attracts much attention. Enron and World Com in America erupts the astonishing financial crisis event in 2001. Taiwan also erupted many companies fraudulent event, so the com...

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Main Authors: Chiu-Chen, Chen, 陳秋禎
Other Authors: Li-jen, Yeh
Format: Others
Language:zh-TW
Published: 2008
Online Access:http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/72313413194983721959
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description 碩士 === 實踐大學 === 財務金融與保險研究所 === 96 === In recent years, corporate governance in the practical realm and the academic realm all attracts much attention. Enron and World Com in America erupts the astonishing financial crisis event in 2001. Taiwan also erupted many companies fraudulent event, so the company must make a set of supervisal mechanism. The government also remodels the article in the laws. The corporate governance is importance not only restricted in the company interior also to be able to affect invests the populace. The data of the Taiwan semiconductor industry for 2004 Q1 to 2007 Q3 were used in data envelopment analysis to evaluate the relative of efficient value. All semiconductor industry divided into two groups according to efficient value. At last, using panel data to find out whether each group has discrepancy. The empirical results are as follow: 1. The relationship between corporate governance variables and ROE: In efficient and inefficiency groups, there have significant non-linear relation between directors shareholding ratio and ROE. In all companies and inefficiency groups, there have significant negative relation between big stockholder ratio and ROE. In three groups, there have significant positive relation between institutional shareholding ratio and ROE. The efficient group has positive significant relation between board size and ROE. In inefficiency group has significant negative relation between independent director seat ratio and ROE. 2. The relationship between corporate governance variables and ROA: In efficient group, there has significant non-linear relation between directors shareholding ratio and ROA. In all companies and inefficiency groups, there have significant negative relation between big stockholder ratio and ROA. In three groups, there have significant positive relation between institutional shareholding ratio and ROA. In all companies and efficient groups, there have significant positive relation between board size and ROA. In all companies and inefficiency groups, there have significant negative relation between independent director seat ratio and ROA. 3. The relationship between corporate governance variables and EPS: Only in inefficiency group, there has significant non-linear relation between manager shareholding ratio and EPS. In all companies and inefficiency groups, there have significant negative relation between big stockholder ratio and EPS. In three groups, there has significant positive relation between institutional shareholding ratio and EPS. Only efficient group has positive significant relation between board size and EPS. In all companies and inefficiency groups, there have significant negative relation between independent director seat ratio and EPS. 4. The relationship between corporate governance variables and Stock Price: In all companies and inefficiency groups, there have significant positive relation between institutional shareholding ratio and Stock Price. Only efficient group has significant positive relation between independent director seat ratio and Stock Price. 5. The relationship between corporate governance variables and Tobin’s Q: In all companies and inefficiency groups, there have significant positive relation between directors and controls mortgage ratio/ big stockholder ratio and Tobin’s Q, and there have significant negative relation between independent director seat ratio and Tobin’s Q. In three groups, there have significant negative relation between institutional shareholding ratio and Tobin’s Q. In all companies and efficiency groups, there have significant negative relation between board size and Tobin’s Q. At last, we find that board of directors in the efficient group display the supervisal mechanism better than other groups, so the effect of monitoring mechanism is obvious in it.
author2 Li-jen, Yeh
author_facet Li-jen, Yeh
Chiu-Chen, Chen
陳秋禎
author Chiu-Chen, Chen
陳秋禎
spellingShingle Chiu-Chen, Chen
陳秋禎
The study of Relationship between Corporate Governance Variables and Operating Performance in Taiwan Semiconductor Industry
author_sort Chiu-Chen, Chen
title The study of Relationship between Corporate Governance Variables and Operating Performance in Taiwan Semiconductor Industry
title_short The study of Relationship between Corporate Governance Variables and Operating Performance in Taiwan Semiconductor Industry
title_full The study of Relationship between Corporate Governance Variables and Operating Performance in Taiwan Semiconductor Industry
title_fullStr The study of Relationship between Corporate Governance Variables and Operating Performance in Taiwan Semiconductor Industry
title_full_unstemmed The study of Relationship between Corporate Governance Variables and Operating Performance in Taiwan Semiconductor Industry
title_sort study of relationship between corporate governance variables and operating performance in taiwan semiconductor industry
publishDate 2008
url http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/72313413194983721959
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spelling ndltd-TW-096SCC003040062015-11-30T04:02:17Z http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/72313413194983721959 The study of Relationship between Corporate Governance Variables and Operating Performance in Taiwan Semiconductor Industry 台灣半導體產業公司治理變數與經營績效之關聯性分析 Chiu-Chen, Chen 陳秋禎 碩士 實踐大學 財務金融與保險研究所 96 In recent years, corporate governance in the practical realm and the academic realm all attracts much attention. Enron and World Com in America erupts the astonishing financial crisis event in 2001. Taiwan also erupted many companies fraudulent event, so the company must make a set of supervisal mechanism. The government also remodels the article in the laws. The corporate governance is importance not only restricted in the company interior also to be able to affect invests the populace. The data of the Taiwan semiconductor industry for 2004 Q1 to 2007 Q3 were used in data envelopment analysis to evaluate the relative of efficient value. All semiconductor industry divided into two groups according to efficient value. At last, using panel data to find out whether each group has discrepancy. The empirical results are as follow: 1. The relationship between corporate governance variables and ROE: In efficient and inefficiency groups, there have significant non-linear relation between directors shareholding ratio and ROE. In all companies and inefficiency groups, there have significant negative relation between big stockholder ratio and ROE. In three groups, there have significant positive relation between institutional shareholding ratio and ROE. The efficient group has positive significant relation between board size and ROE. In inefficiency group has significant negative relation between independent director seat ratio and ROE. 2. The relationship between corporate governance variables and ROA: In efficient group, there has significant non-linear relation between directors shareholding ratio and ROA. In all companies and inefficiency groups, there have significant negative relation between big stockholder ratio and ROA. In three groups, there have significant positive relation between institutional shareholding ratio and ROA. In all companies and efficient groups, there have significant positive relation between board size and ROA. In all companies and inefficiency groups, there have significant negative relation between independent director seat ratio and ROA. 3. The relationship between corporate governance variables and EPS: Only in inefficiency group, there has significant non-linear relation between manager shareholding ratio and EPS. In all companies and inefficiency groups, there have significant negative relation between big stockholder ratio and EPS. In three groups, there has significant positive relation between institutional shareholding ratio and EPS. Only efficient group has positive significant relation between board size and EPS. In all companies and inefficiency groups, there have significant negative relation between independent director seat ratio and EPS. 4. The relationship between corporate governance variables and Stock Price: In all companies and inefficiency groups, there have significant positive relation between institutional shareholding ratio and Stock Price. Only efficient group has significant positive relation between independent director seat ratio and Stock Price. 5. The relationship between corporate governance variables and Tobin’s Q: In all companies and inefficiency groups, there have significant positive relation between directors and controls mortgage ratio/ big stockholder ratio and Tobin’s Q, and there have significant negative relation between independent director seat ratio and Tobin’s Q. In three groups, there have significant negative relation between institutional shareholding ratio and Tobin’s Q. In all companies and efficiency groups, there have significant negative relation between board size and Tobin’s Q. At last, we find that board of directors in the efficient group display the supervisal mechanism better than other groups, so the effect of monitoring mechanism is obvious in it. Li-jen, Yeh Jer-Shiou, Chiou 葉立仁 邱哲修 2008 學位論文 ; thesis 97 zh-TW