| Summary: | 碩士 === 實踐大學 === 企業管理學系碩士班 === 96 === Since the implementation of Financial Holding Company Act, a lot of financial institutions carry out cross-marketing on different industries through resource integration, product combination and data sharing so as to provide consumers with one-stop financial service; thus, every financial industry hopes to set up good image so that the consumers can have trust on it, then the consumers would choose to have business transactions with it. And, the diversification of the marketing channels for insurance products is also one of the key concerning factors when consumers are purchasing. Besides the new development of marketing channels such as virtual Internet and phone, most marketing channels still rely on the traditional sales force to carry out product promotion.
This study regards the influence that consumers’ evaluation and trust level have towards insurance, banking, and securities as the study content first. Then, this study discusses if the consumers have known marketing sales because of business transaction experience, whether this would change the consumers’ selection with regard to the purchasing channels of insurance products or not. Next, the cross validation of three channels is carried out so as to examine whether it is possible to change the asymmetric channels, and the marketing sales from which channel can still master the advantageous position of selling insurance products. This study uses the Internet questionnaire of the study regarding “analysis on the image and trust of insurance channels” as the study sample, where this analysis is distributed by CARDIF Bancassurance research center of Shih Chien University through 104 Corporation in 2007; and then SPSS 12.0 is used for validation. The result of case analysis is as follows:
1.Under the circumstance that the consumers knew the insurance representatives because of purchase experience, the relationship between trust level and purchasing selection tendency would be weakened and the probability to purchase product from him would be lower. However, after comparing with financial advisor, one finds that the consumers who know financial advisors still tend to purchase products from insurance representatives, which shows that asymmetric channel does not cause the insurance representatives to lose marketing advantageous position totally.
2. In the validations for insurance representative and financial advisor, one finds that if the consumers know securities specialist under the two kinds of channels respectively, then the relationship between the consumers’ trust level and purchasing selection tendency would be weakened, in other words, if the consumers know any securities specialist, a relatively unfavorable situation would be formed with regard to insurance representative and financial advisor.
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