| Summary: | 碩士 === 國立臺灣大學 === 國家發展研究所 === 96 === Since 1979, Washington has adopted “Strategic Ambiguity” as its guiding principle in dealing with Taiwan and China. But that also has invited both sides of Taiwan Strait to probe the limits and that also has resulted in some crisis during Bill Clinton’s presidency. Before George W. Bush came to his office, he has favored speaking clearly. After he started his presidency, the cross-strait policy of his administration has turned from the strategic ambiguity to “Strategic Clarity” in which Bush uses a dual approach—the US tolerates no Chinese military actions on Taiwan and the US does not support and even is against “Taiwan independence,” to prevent both sides from crossing the red line. However, during his eight-year presidency, challenges to the policy have never stopped.
In this study, I have tried to examine the dilemma of President George W. Bush’s “Strategic Clarity” policy and found out two crucial factors contributing to this difficult situation: first, the rigid U.S. and Taiwan friendly bilateral-relationship and the adversarial relationship between the two sides of Taiwan Strait. Second, the U.S. has fallen into the dilemma of “Unintended Pivot.” By means of theoretical analysis, two variables, the rigid friendly bilateral-relationship and the dilemma of “Unintended Pivot”, which result from self-identity consciousness, will be put into the Asymmetrical Triangles Macro Utility Pattern analytical pattern to search for the best Asymmetrical Triangle Macro Pattern so as to help clear away all the obstacles in the way of President Bush’s Strategic Clarity Policy for the Cross-Strait dilemma.
After the theoretical analysis of the Asymmetrical Triangles Macro Utility Pattern, I have got a conclusion that the “M’ enage a trios”strategic triangle is the best strategic triangle shape.
However, while put into practice, the“M’ enage a trios”strategic triangle would face two challenges. The first one is whether the United States can maintain its stable bilateral relations of allies with Taiwan as well as its Asia-Pacific military layout. The fact is that, though the U.S. has been seeking for the cross-strait economic and trade cooperation instead of ideological confrontation between both sides of the Strait., it would not be happy to see them move toward reconciliation on the military level. The second challenge lies in the internal political changes. If Washington intends to move toward the establishment of a “trilateral family-type (M’ enage a trios)” strategic triangle, and would like to promote the cross-strait dialogue, the internal political factors should be taken into consideration.
In addition to the ongoing examinations and theoretical analysis, some measures can be taken, such as reducing the cooperation with China on "anti-independence" issues, and making use of Chinese negative image in some of the diplomatic contradictions as a bargaining chip to maintain “the relationship of constructive cooperation” with China.
In this study, George W. Bush’s strategic clarity policy has been inspected through the strategic triangle theory in the U.S. national interests’ premise, with a conclusion indicating solutions to the dilemma of the U.S., in hope to offer the result of my efforts for theoretical dialogue on this subject among the academic and political circles.
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