Spatial Competition in a Circular Market with Delivery Direction Choice

• Main Authors: Yuan-Chang Cheng, 鄭元菖
• Other Authors: Fu-Chuan Lai
• Format: Others
• Language: en_US
• Published: 2008
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/26506350153393286945

碩士 === 國立臺北大學 === 經濟學系 === 96 === This thesis employs two concepts that are the direction choices on product delivery and the first-entrant-take-all rule in order to capture the major characteristics on some public utility industries, such as the natural gas or electricity industries. It is shown that there are two equilibrium outcomes in a circular market with Cournot competition: one is when two firms agglomerate at one point and transport their goods in opposite directions, and the other is when both firms locate equidistantly from each other and deliver the products in the same direction. These results are striking in that agglomeration location is one of the equilibrium patterns and there is no market overlap in equilibrium.