A Game-Theoretical Analysis of Holdouts of Land Owners in Private Land Assembly and Development

• Main Authors: Lo, chun-chieh, 羅浚杰
• Other Authors: Lai, Shih-Kung
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2008
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/06072663728327329159

碩士 === 國立臺北大學 === 不動產與城鄉環境學系 === 96 === Land development is fundamental to urban construction; however, there are many obstructions of such construction, one of which is the disagreement of assembly of land owners. As far as land scale is concerned, it is helpful to achieve the economies of scale with the most efficient use, and the external benefit when the land scale comes in the most proper area. Nevertheless, the holdout behavior blocks the assembly, not only increasing the cost of bargaining, but also causing the unfairness between the land owners who cooperate and the holdout. The best result of integration is that all the land owners are willing to join the development project under consideration. However, our findings show that when the holdout’s land is indivisible, developer can not accept the prohibitive price, so the project is fails. On the contrary, when the holdout’s land is divisible, the goal of assembly can be realized, because of the threat of elimination. It is difficult to reach a cooperative resolution without some kind of restriction or commitment, so government interventions are necessary. By means of land Policies such as eminent domain, land tribunal, price ceiling and the resolution ratio, it is helpful to eliminate holdout behavior. The governmental systems can reach the goal of cooperation, but some differences and influences of such actions remain to be investigated.