| Summary: | 碩士 === 國立中山大學 === 經濟學研究所 === 96 === Cheat, a kind of crime, happens in the classroom. This paper is purposed to find how to reduce the probability of cheating, how the policy can make an effect on teachers and students, and how to achieve the best interaction between them. The best interaction is that teachers put in high effort and students choose the strategy which is not to cheat. In the beginning, we assume the game is static. Under the mixed strategy equilibrium, the punishment to cheat has nothing to do with reducing the probability of cheating, but it has a trade-off relation with the probability of teachers to put in high effort. If we add peer pressure into the students’ utility, it will take more probability of teachers to put in high effort to avoid cheating. However, if the policy which is to reward teachers who put in high effort brings into effect, it helps not only reduce the probability of cheating but also achieve the best interaction.
After the mixed strategy equilibrium, I release two assumptions. One is to transform the game from static into dynamic, and the other is to make the effort function become continuous. Teachers then become first mover. At this moment, teachers have first-move advantage. When teachers put in some effort more than the level mentioned in the article, students do not have the incentive to cheat. In this case, it is easier to achieve the best reaction.
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