The Effect of Information Asymmetry and Bargaining Power on the Choice among Financing Securities for US Venture Firms
碩士 === 國立交通大學 === 企業管理碩士學程 === 96 === Prior studies of the financing contracts between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs most typically focus on analytical deduction. Specifically, they investigate agency settings with double moral hazard and/or adverse selection. In contrast, this study empiric...
Main Authors: | Chien-Liang Liao, 廖健良 |
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Other Authors: | Hsiou-Wei W. Lin |
Format: | Others |
Language: | zh-TW |
Published: |
2008
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Online Access: | http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/veuf4k |
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