| Summary: | 碩士 === 國立政治大學 === 財政研究所 === 96 === After observing most elections in Taiwan, including the elections of the mayor, the head of the county and the legislators, it is very often for us to find those reports about that the authorities of the party dissuade the beginning candidates from running for the elections in order to raise the winning chance in elections. Jue-Shyan（2007）once discussed this correlative issue, and the focus of his paper is those elections that are only inside the party. However, to make the model in accord with the current conditions, we put another variable, the gain from the winning candidate of the same party, into the model to do further analyses. This paper establishes a model of game theory by using the concept of sequential equilibrium to explain the phenomenon in which authorities of the party dissuade the beginning candidates from running for the elections. Besides, it also points out that it is more difficult for the authorities to dissuade candidates from running for elections under the following conditions: the position in the party to be campaigned is higher, the winning probability of competing with other party is higher, and the opponent of the other party is not tough.
|
|---|
