| Summary: | 博士 === 國立政治大學 === 政治研究所 === 96 === The dissertation mainly explains why these three emerging markets, Chile, South Korea and Brazil, while facing the same challenge from the international economic liberalization since the late 1970s, have different short-term policy responses. These differences ultimately create the divergence among these three countries on the long-term financial liberalization reform. This research integrates the domestic and international level of analysis by focusing on two parts, the international policy environment and the domestic policy process and outcome, to observe the interaction between the institutional veto points and the key actors in policymaking and its impact on the financial liberalization reforms among three countries over time.
First, this research constructs three typologies of long-term financial liberalization paths by their different reform “pace”, “scope” and “depth”. They are “shock-comprehensive reform”, “gradual-partial reform”, and “delayed-limited reform.” The divergence of these three long-term financial reforms is mainly accumulated by the change of three countries’ short-term type of reform (large reform, gradual reform, non reform and reform reversal) over time.
Second, this research clarifies the evolution of the long-term financial liberalization paths of three countries by conducting comparative and longitudinal case-studies. It argues that the change of short-term type of reform is mainly influenced by two causes, i.e. the veto power of opponents among key actors in policymaking (weak or strong) and policy orientations of the ruling coalition (market-oriented or state intervention).
The case of Chile shows that the “shock-comprehensive reform paths” during 1970-2000 is mainly based on the successful large financial reform of Pinochet regime from 1975 to 1989. The pro-Pinochet authoritarians checked the change of pragmatic neoliberal reform with the constitutional veto powers after the democratic Concertación government in office and kept Pinochet-style economic policies intact in the end.
In South Korea case, the “gradual-partial reform paths” was from the big conglomerates’ (chaebols) opposition to the complete financial liberalization during 1980-1997. It brought the tug of war of ruling coalition’s policy orientation between market-oriented and state intervention, hence contributed to the oscillation of short-term financial liberalization reform types between large reform and reform reversal in South Korea. In 1997, the Asian financial crisis hit the economy of South Korea severely, and brought the turning point of the change of “gradual-partial reform path” in the past.
The structure of old ruling coalition was collapsed due to the regime change and the takeover of President Kim Dae-jung, the market reform faction. While the veto power of opposition party was getting weaker, Kim Dae-jung administration was able to boost the structural reform of financial system in South Korean during 1998-2000, and ultimately contributed to the major change of “gradual-partial reform path”.
In Brazil, the absence of the combination of policy orientation and veto power of opponents among key actors in policymaking, which may cause the large reform, was the main reason of its “delayed-limited reform”. During 1961-1979, the weakening opponents’ veto power opened the window of opportunity for the large reform, but failed due to the state-intervention policies adopted by the successive ruling coalitions most of time.
After the advent of democratic era in 1985, the market-oriented policy was dominant in various democratic ruling coalitions. However, the strengthening veto power of opponents after the recovery of democratic regime became the obstacle of the actualization of reform policy. The mismatch of two causes which may contribute to the happening of large reform was not changed until Cardoso government in office. The neoliberal policy orientation of President Cardoso’s ruling coalition and the weakening veto power of opponents contributed to the rare large reform in the path of delayed and limited financial liberalization in Brazil.
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