| Summary: | 碩士 === 輔仁大學 === 會計學系碩士班 === 96 === In this research, samples were taken from both state-owned enterprises and private enterprises that have recently gone IPO. The porpose of the research are to find out whethere state-owned enterprises are more likely to apply related party transactions to manage earnings prior to going IPO than private enterprises are, wherether tunneling is present following IPO, and how investors respond to the information contents of related party transactions in post- IPO period. We also discuss whether good corporate governance can reduce the intensity of Tunneling. Our findings are summarized below:
1.When a company is going to IPO, state-owned enterprises are more likely to use related party transactions to manage earnings than r private enterprises are.
2.if earnings are manipulated through related party transactions before going to IPO, tunneling of state-owned enterprises is more serious than that of private enterprises.
3.If earnings are manipulated by related party transactions before IPO, the return on investment in state-owned enterprises is less than that in private enterprises.
4.Following IPO, the corporate governance can strengthen the supervisory system, but the phoniminon of tunneling is not mitigating.
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