Has Board Composition Become Internalized Graudually? Long Term Evidence from Taiwan Listed Companies
碩士 === 輔仁大學 === 金融研究所 === 96 === We regard board composition as endogenous variable, we try to examine the effect between ownership structure and board composition with long term evidence by using the familism and internalization ratio of board of directors to be the proxy of board composition. The...
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ndltd-TW-096FJU002140012015-11-30T04:02:52Z http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/83008650199274272000 Has Board Composition Become Internalized Graudually? Long Term Evidence from Taiwan Listed Companies 董事會是否逐漸內部化-台灣上市公司長期驗證 Li, Shiao-Wen 李曉雯 碩士 輔仁大學 金融研究所 96 We regard board composition as endogenous variable, we try to examine the effect between ownership structure and board composition with long term evidence by using the familism and internalization ratio of board of directors to be the proxy of board composition. The research data are 530 listed companies in Taiwan. Adopting the method developed by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1999), we find the controlling shareholders of firm and then calculate their cash flow right and voting right from IPO to 2006. The results suggest that controlling shareholders with higher voting right will have higher proportion of board seats, in other words, the higher level of familism (internalization) of board of directors.Controlling shareholders hold more proportion of board seats, the corporate value (ROA) will be worse. Yeh, Yin-Hua 葉銀華 2008 學位論文 ; thesis 95 zh-TW |
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碩士 === 輔仁大學 === 金融研究所 === 96 === We regard board composition as endogenous variable, we try to examine the effect between ownership structure and board composition with long term evidence by using the familism and internalization ratio of board of directors to be the proxy of board composition.
The research data are 530 listed companies in Taiwan. Adopting the method developed by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1999), we find the controlling shareholders of firm and then calculate their cash flow right and voting right from IPO to 2006. The results suggest that controlling shareholders with higher voting right will have higher proportion of board seats, in other words, the higher level of familism (internalization) of board of directors.Controlling shareholders hold more proportion of board seats, the corporate value (ROA) will be worse.
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author2 |
Yeh, Yin-Hua |
author_facet |
Yeh, Yin-Hua Li, Shiao-Wen 李曉雯 |
author |
Li, Shiao-Wen 李曉雯 |
spellingShingle |
Li, Shiao-Wen 李曉雯 Has Board Composition Become Internalized Graudually? Long Term Evidence from Taiwan Listed Companies |
author_sort |
Li, Shiao-Wen |
title |
Has Board Composition Become Internalized Graudually? Long Term Evidence from Taiwan Listed Companies |
title_short |
Has Board Composition Become Internalized Graudually? Long Term Evidence from Taiwan Listed Companies |
title_full |
Has Board Composition Become Internalized Graudually? Long Term Evidence from Taiwan Listed Companies |
title_fullStr |
Has Board Composition Become Internalized Graudually? Long Term Evidence from Taiwan Listed Companies |
title_full_unstemmed |
Has Board Composition Become Internalized Graudually? Long Term Evidence from Taiwan Listed Companies |
title_sort |
has board composition become internalized graudually? long term evidence from taiwan listed companies |
publishDate |
2008 |
url |
http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/83008650199274272000 |
work_keys_str_mv |
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