| Summary: | 碩士 === 輔仁大學 === 金融研究所 === 96 === We regard board composition as endogenous variable, we try to examine the effect between ownership structure and board composition with long term evidence by using the familism and internalization ratio of board of directors to be the proxy of board composition.
The research data are 530 listed companies in Taiwan. Adopting the method developed by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1999), we find the controlling shareholders of firm and then calculate their cash flow right and voting right from IPO to 2006. The results suggest that controlling shareholders with higher voting right will have higher proportion of board seats, in other words, the higher level of familism (internalization) of board of directors.Controlling shareholders hold more proportion of board seats, the corporate value (ROA) will be worse.
|
|---|
