Perceptual Experience and New Version of Indirect Realism

• Main Authors: Jeff Ruan, 阮哲夫
• Other Authors: Caleb Y.-Y. Liang
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2008
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/27473896576080604201

碩士 === 國立中正大學 === 哲學所 === 96 === This thesis is aimed at accounting the fundamental characters of perceptual experience in terms of indirect realism. Intuitively there are two fundamental characters of our perception: first, what I call “directness” is that, we directly perceive the properties of external physical object. Second, what I call “constancy” is that, the properties we perceive are constant as their physical properties. Besides, our perceptual experience often goes together with thought: we can consider our experience, possess relevant beliefs or concepts. We may see it as one of the characters of our perceptual experience which I call “conception”. We take our experience for granted. However, we theoretically need to account for the three characters of perceptual experience. I will provide a new version of indirect realism to explain our three characters of experience. I will argue that we indirectly perceive physical objects by being directly aware of an empirically virtual presence. There are three main opinions that account for the three characters of perceptual experience of which we are concerned. The first opinion accepts direct realism, nonconceptualism, and agrees that the content of perceptual experience is constant. The second opinion asserts indirect realism and claims that the content of perceptual experience is nonconstant. The third opinion accepts direct realism, conceptualism. This opinion also thinks that perceptual content possesses two-dimensionality: constant and nonconstant. In this thesis I will examine which opinion above is a plausible account of the essence of perceptual experience. I will suggest that neither of these opinions allows the development of a satisfactory account. I hold that in order to provide a plausible account for the essence of perceptual experience we should accept our new version of indirect realism.