The Effects of Double Externalities on the Firms’ Cooperation Decisions and Social Welfare under Doupoly

• Main Authors: Jia-Han Chang, 張佳涵
• Other Authors: Yu-Jen Cheng
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2007
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/13705659912475576575

碩士 === 國立高雄大學 === 經濟管理研究所 === 95 === Past researchers had investigated the phenomena of network externality and technology spillovers (i.e. knowledge externality) thoroughly but separately. Yet, the authors neglected the fact that there are lots of products (e.g. 3C goods) possess these two characteristics simultaneously. The purpose of this paper is trying to reveal the impacts of the above double externalities on firms’ cooperative decision-making. We set up a two-stage game model with double externalities in duopoly market which refers to the model of technology spillovers by d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) and the model of network externality by Economides (1996). In this paper we examine the influences of network externality and technology spillovers on the firms’ cooperation choices. In addition, we also compare the difference in firms’ R&D efforts, outputs, profits, and social welfares with the results of the first best social welfare under the condition of fulfilled expectations equilibrium with different kinds of cooperative regimes. At the first stage, firms decide whether they will jointly engage in the R&D cooperation, and at the second stage, firms decide whether they will undertake the marketing cooperation. In additional, we invite R&D efficiency variable in our model to discuss the effect of cooperative decision-making and social welfare. We show that: 1. network externality positively affects firms’ R&D efforts, outputs, profits, and social welfares. The influence of technology spillovers and R&D efficiency on firms depends on the kind of cooperation strategies. 2. In the condition of fulfilled expectations equilibrium: (1) if the spillover effects are significant, the R&D effort is the greatest when the firms decide to cooperate at both stages; the social welfare is the greatest when the firms decide to cooperate at R&D stage; and the output is the least when the firms decide to cooperate at marketing stage. (2) if the spillover effects are non-significant, the R&D efforts, outputs, and social welfares are the greatest when the firms do not cooperate at both stages; the R&D efforts and profits are the least when firms cooperate at marketing stage; and finally, the output and social welfare are the least when firms cooperate at both stages. (3) IV the advance of R&D efficiency will raise firms’ R&D efforts and outputs, but will deteriorate the profits when firms cooperate at both stages or cooperate only at R&D stage.