| Summary: | 碩士 === 國立高雄大學 === 經濟管理研究所 === 95 === Past researchers had investigated the phenomena of network externality and technology
spillovers (i.e. knowledge externality) thoroughly but separately. Yet, the authors neglected
the fact that there are lots of products (e.g. 3C goods) possess these two characteristics
simultaneously. The purpose of this paper is trying to reveal the impacts of the above double
externalities on firms’ cooperative decision-making. We set up a two-stage game model with
double externalities in duopoly market which refers to the model of technology spillovers by
d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) and the model of network externality by Economides
(1996).
In this paper we examine the influences of network externality and technology spillovers
on the firms’ cooperation choices. In addition, we also compare the difference in firms’ R&D
efforts, outputs, profits, and social welfares with the results of the first best social welfare
under the condition of fulfilled expectations equilibrium with different kinds of cooperative
regimes. At the first stage, firms decide whether they will jointly engage in the R&D
cooperation, and at the second stage, firms decide whether they will undertake the marketing
cooperation. In additional, we invite R&D efficiency variable in our model to discuss the
effect of cooperative decision-making and social welfare.
We show that: 1. network externality positively affects firms’ R&D efforts, outputs,
profits, and social welfares. The influence of technology spillovers and R&D efficiency on
firms depends on the kind of cooperation strategies. 2. In the condition of fulfilled
expectations equilibrium: (1) if the spillover effects are significant, the R&D effort is the
greatest when the firms decide to cooperate at both stages; the social welfare is the greatest
when the firms decide to cooperate at R&D stage; and the output is the least when the firms
decide to cooperate at marketing stage. (2) if the spillover effects are non-significant, the
R&D efforts, outputs, and social welfares are the greatest when the firms do not cooperate at
both stages; the R&D efforts and profits are the least when firms cooperate at marketing stage;
and finally, the output and social welfare are the least when firms cooperate at both stages. (3)
IV
the advance of R&D efficiency will raise firms’ R&D efforts and outputs, but will deteriorate
the profits when firms cooperate at both stages or cooperate only at R&D stage.
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