Announcement and Learning Incentive in Mergers and Acquisitions

• Main Authors: Pin-Chuen Liauw, 廖品荃
• Other Authors: 邱顯比
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2007
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/01406951116211540566

碩士 === 國立臺灣大學 === 財務金融學研究所 === 95 === This paper presents an analytical model about managers’ learning behavior in mergers and acquisitions (M&As). The amount of the expected synergy, the accuracy of the market information, and the splitting of the synergy pie with the target all have an influence on the bidder’s willingness to disclose news to the public and learn from the market reaction. The target’s incentive, however, is not necessarily the same as the bidder’s, which may further result in disclosure inefficiency. To solve this problem, a bidding structure with risk sharing such as the utilization of the stock exchange can be implemented.