U.S. Deterrence Strategy in the Taiwan Strait after the Cold War

• Main Authors: Kai-Tai Tang, 唐開太
• Other Authors: Tzong-ho, Bau
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2007
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/50669290560988694475

博士 === 國立臺灣大學 === 政治學研究所 === 95 === Deterrence theory developed in the Cold War era. After the end of the Cold War, the trend of “general deterrence” prevails, along with the emergence of “revolution on military affairs”, which affects the development of deterrence theory. Under such circumstances, the discussion on the application of deterrence theory in the Taiwan Strait is valuable for academic and policy reasons. The dissertation asserts that the reasons for the United States to deter conflict in the Taiwan Strait are mainly because of the nature of potential conflict and national interest in the region. The former includes sovereignty dispute, institutional differences, absence of mutual trust, and arms races between both sides of the Strait. The latter includes maintaining regional influence, engagement with an emerging power, protecting regional security, deterring invasion, and preventing provocation by either side. The author argues that Taiwan is not of vital interest for the United States; however, the security in the Taiwan Strait affects the vital interest of the United States, which is why the United States has to deter the conflict in the region. As far as the deterrence strategy in the Taiwan Strait is concerned, U.S. deterrence thinking collaborates with its global strategy to prevent the rise of potential competitors from challenging its interests, as well as to deter regional invader to maintain its regional influence and reputation among allies. As a matter of fact, U.S. deterrence strategy evolves from “one-size-fits-all” deterrence to strategy of “layered deterrence”, then turns to “tailored deterrence”. As for the tools of deterrence, the United States uses the readjustment of force deployment in the Asian Pacific, the realignment of Asian Pacific allies, demonstration of force, arms sales to Taiwan, the development and deployment of missile defense systems, the declaration of deterrence rhetoric to prevent either side from provocation and any endeavor to spoil the status quo. China’s perception of U.S. deterrence strategy is that the United States intends to pursue and maintain hegemony, contain China and impede reunification of the nation, and therefore readjust its force deployment in the Asian Pacific and work with its allies to deter China to deplete China’s strength and resources in the “Taiwan issue”, and prepares for military intervention through the demonstration of force. Nevertheless, as a result of the gradual awareness of US’s dual deterrence, China has shifted from rejection and rivalry to cooperation and appeasement. China avoids direct confrontation with the United States on its propaganda and emphasizes long-term development in military planning to build its own anti-deterrence strategy and capability to cope with crisis. Taiwan regards U.S. deterrence strategy as hostile to China, and agrees with American view on China’s military development obviously exceeding reasonable demand for defense. Taiwan thinks that China is the common security threat of the United States and Taiwan. Taiwan believes that it is an unsinkable aircraft carrier of the United States in East Asia; thus the United States doesn’t want to see Taiwan fallen to the China’s control. Moreover, Taiwan and the United States are both democracies, so the United States might come to Taiwan’s rescue once war happens in the Taiwan Strait. In response to U.S. deterrence rhetoric, Taiwan has been assuring to the United States that Taiwan won’t provoke Beijing, claiming that its China policy remains unchanged, and reiterating its resolve to strengthen the communication with the United States. This dissertations tries to construct a framework from three levels of analysis: (1)threat v.s. reassurance, (2)the mix of means of deterrence - threat, neutrality and alliance, (3)strategic ambiguity v.s. strategic clarity. The author divides the patterns of deterrence in the Taiwan Strait into “Dual Clarity Deterrence”, “Twilight-Zone”, “Janus-Faced under strategic ambiguity”, “Janus-Faced under strategic clarity”, “Straddle Strategy”, and “Fair-Weather Friends”. The dissertation argues that “Straddle Strategy” pattern, meaning that U.S. deters China with possible alliance with Taiwan and deters Taiwan with neutrality in potential conflict, is the most powerful explanation for current situation. “Dual Clarity” pattern, meaning setting deadlines for China and Taiwan not to step over, is most effective. The dissertation concludes that dual deterrence could last for a long period of time because the U.S. has gradually acquired the “dual deterrence” savvy. The structure of “dual deterrence”, however, might collapse because of the rapid development of China’s military modernization to challenge the U.S. or of Taiwan’s intention to pursue de jure independence.