The Motivation Effect of Incentive Schemes: An Experimental Study

• Main Authors: I-Chu Chung, 鍾亦筑
• Other Authors: Chia-Yu Hung
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2007
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/dsg6k4

博士 === 國立東華大學 === 經濟學系 === 95 === No matter the enterprise structure is by individual or team, generally speaking, the very few employees are willing to work hard spontaneously. Therefore this dissertation attempts to discuss the administrator when faces the different type employees, how to design the incentive schemes to motivate his employees, in view of different enterprise structure, then to achieve the organization goal. In the first part of this dissertation, we review the related literature of reward and penalty system, and discuss the related questions in economic or psychology field. The second part aims to find out the most effective individual incentive scheme which has motivation effect. Suppose the administrator attempt to motivate the employee by a fixed amount prize, under administrator's prize structural design, the employee will have an opportunity to get the prize through contest. At this moment, how should administrator design the structure of the competition degree and prize distribution? In addition, administrator must also consider the difference of motivation effect adopting the incentive scheme when he faces the different kinds of employee. Finally, the third part will focus on teamwork, compared the reward system with the penalty system in symmetric or asymmetric information environment. The results of this dissertation: 1.We report a series of experiments that document the difference of motivation effect produced by different prize structure between different abilities of employee. Suggest administrator should determine the goal of organization firstly, and then design the appropriate prize structure. In order to avoid appears opposite result with the goal of organization. 2.We report another series of experiments that document significantly higher motivation effect when penalty system is used, both in symmetric or asymmetric information environment. 3.To find definition of free-rider behavior and the phenomenon of slack. Then under different prize structures, we compare what kind ability of employee is trying to slack. Perhaps in different information environment, compared with what kind of incentive scheme is easy to arise free riding or the phenomenon of slack.