Governance and Contract Arrangement of Mutual Fund Family

• Main Authors: Yi-An Chen, 陳怡安
• Other Authors: Li-Wen Chen
• Format: Others
• Language: en_US
• Published: 2007
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/40492791328098431363

碩士 === 國立暨南國際大學 === 財務金融學系 === 95 === This paper investigates whether ownership and governance structures affect mutual fund families’ decisions on running their funds internally or externally. Two important findings have been documented. First, the in-house funds of 100% in-house fund families achieve better performance than the outsourced funds of 100% outsourced fund families. For the mixed fund families having in-house and outsourced contract arrangements simultaneously,outsourced funds are associated with better performance. Second, governance structures play important roles in discipline fund families. Fund families with smaller board size, higher percentage of independent directors, particularly those with 75% or higher, and insider chairman are associated with running their funds internally. Ownership structure does not seem to play critical role in contract arrangement. In sum, our findings reinforce SEC’s proposal that governance reform in fund industry is urgent and needed.