| Summary: | 碩士 === 中興大學 === 應用經濟學系所 === 95 === This study is focused on the quota auction system in Taiwan rice market. The winning bidders’ real pricing evaluation on imported rice quota is analyzed to measure the expected returns of public administrator from bidders’ actual pricing decisions and bidding behavior. Besides, the Winner’s Curse hypothesis is tested in this multiple-bids-multiple-unit model. Also, some improved strategies with better profitability under the current bidding system are proposed to the government in this study.
Observations from bidding market for imported rice data during 2003 to 2006 are selected for the study. Related variables include number of winning bidders, value uncertainty of objects and the rice price in domestic markets. The Linear Regression Model was adopted in this study.
Empirical results indicate as follows.
1. Positive correlation exists both between the number of winning bids and the variance of winning bids, and the variance of domestic rice prices and variance of winning bidders’ prices. But the reverse relation can be found between the total quantity of bidding imported rice and variation of winning bidders’ prices.
2. With the Common Value Model specification, this study finds that the current rice auction system has no solid prove in Winner’s curse.
3. Statistical findings also support that the auction system can be improved to increase the expected profit with different strategies, which include the expansion in the number of competing bidders or announcement of base price.
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