| Summary: | 碩士 === 中興大學 === 企業管理學系所 === 95 === The purpose of this paper is to analyze how a internet channel affects every channel member by game theory while it accedes to forthcoming vertical channel system. When does a manufacture or a retailer introduce the internet channel. We focus on channel members’ position and bargaining power.
On the basic model, We consider a manufacture and an independent physical retailer. Channel decisions and price decisions of firms are our decision parameters. We continue use Chiang’s (2003) model, and add a parameter of customer acceptance of a internet channel in our model. We find that when a manufacture has higher bargaining power relative to a retailer, it will use the price discrimination strategy in order to exert synergy of virtual and physical channels. A retailer introduces the internet channel uncertainly. In contrast, when a retailer has higher bargaining power relative to a manufacture, a manufacture can’t use the price discrimination strategy nicely. At this moment, a manufacture can’t introduce the internet channel. However, even if a retailer introduces the internet channel, no selling volume in this internet channel. So internet channel is just a accessory role for a retailer.
On the extended model, we add another two factors. At first, we add a new internet group that prefer internet channel, and there are three groups in this model. Second, we consider that a manufacture introduce the internet channel, and it is afraid that a retailer rises up to fight against it’s price decisions. So a manufacture’s internet price is the same as retail price. We find that when a manufacture has higher bargaining power relative to a retailer and a little of internet customers that prefer the internet channel, only a manufacture introduces the internet channel. In contrast, a great deal of internet customers that prefer internet channel, a manufacture and a retailer introduce the internet channel. When a manufacture has smaller bargaining power relative to a retailer, both a manufacture and a retailer introduce the internet channel.
In conclusion, bargaining power and customer acceptance of the internet channel can affect the channel decision and price decision of firms. So we suggest that before firms introduce the internet channel, they must evaluate their bargaining power and distribution of customers.
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