| Summary: | 碩士 === 國立政治大學 === 會計研究所 === 95 === This thesis examines directly whether that managers provide more (less) information to analysts with more (less) favorable stock recommendations, based on the Barron et al. model (1998). Prior study documents the relative forecast accuracy of analysts before and after a recommendation issuance under the assumption that increases (decreases) in management-provided information will increase (decrease) analysts’ relative forecast accuracy. In contrast, this paper directly measure amount of information based on Barron et al. model (1998), and examine whether amount of information varies between pre- and post- a recommendation. Contrary to our prediction, the results show no significant difference in amount of information after and before recommendation issuance.
However, we do find that analysts issuing more favorable recommendations experience a greater increase in their relative forecast accuracy compared with analysts with less favorable recommendations. In addition, we also find that the association is smaller for firms with higher information transparency than those with lower information transparency. The information transparency is measure by whether firms are listed in Taiwan Securities & Futures Information Center’s Information Disclosure and Transparence Ranking System (therefore TSFIC).
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