A Study on the Relationship between Board Structure and Top Executive Turnover- An Empirical Evidence of Listed and OTC Banks in Taiwan

• Main Authors: Wan-Jen Tsai, 蔡婉貞
• Other Authors: 丁碧慧
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2007
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/8s9639

碩士 === 長榮大學 === 經營管理研究所 === 95 === This study discusses whether the composition of the board and the ownership structure affect top executive turnover: an empirical evidence of listed and OTC banks in Taiwan is used to test the impact of the interaction of external corporate governance and control on top executive turnover. The evidence indicates that firm performance has weaken negative impact on the probability of turnover in financial industry. Hence, the study distinguishes the types of top executives into insider and outsider aspects. When the top executives are insiders, poor firm performance doesn’t affect the top executive turnover. In other words, if the top executives are outsiders, firm performance has significantly negative impact over the top executive turnover. The paper also discovers that internal corporate governance has significantly impact on the top executive who is an outsider. The higher rank of top executives who are not controlling stockholders but with power over stockholders, the more chance to maneuver their firms effectively. Furthermore, the more inside board directors with exceeding power obtain adverse effect to eliminate unfit top executives, which implies that the poor corporate governance occurs. As to the external corporate governance, the top executive efficiency over their firms has nothing to do with their relationship with controlling stockholders. Key：Top Executives Turnover, Corporate Governance, Board Structure