Summary: | 碩士 === 國立中正大學 === 會計與資訊科技所 === 95 === This study examines the earnings management incentives of impairment and the moderating role of corporate governance. We investigate the relations between the earnings management incentives of impairment and the effects of agency problem, corporate governance strength, auditors independence and audit quality. The results of our study indicate that (1) impairment amount is a new tool on earnings management, i.e. taking a big bath or income smoothing. (2) ultimate ownership agency conflict problem and auditors independence have no significant effect on earnings management of impairment loss, (3) independent board directors and independent supervisors reduce the incentives of taking a big bath and income smoothing, (4) audit quality, which is proxy by a whether Big 4 audit firm, reduce the incentives of taking a big bath, but could not moderate the incentives of income smoothing. These results suggest that we should strengthen corporate governance structures and appraisal systems to report factual impairment amount.
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