The Dispositionalist response of the problem of Rule-Following

• Main Authors: Hui-chin Sun, 孫慧瑾
• Other Authors: none
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2007
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/10757452811040058561

碩士 === 國立中正大學 === 哲學所 === 95 === This thesis discusses the dispositionalist response to the problem of rule-following which Saul Kripke (1982) finds in Wittgenstein (1953, 1958). Kripke points out that underlying the problem of “Rule-Following” is a “skeptical paradox”: it is argued that there is no fact of the matter that determines which rule a person follows. My discussion focuses on the plausibility of Dispositionism in answering the skeptic. In this thesis, I first explain how the “skeptical paradox” about meaning is derived. I then examine whether various dispositional accounts have succeeded in dealing with the skeptical paradox by solving the “error problem”, the “infinite problem” and the “normativity problem”. My conclusion is that, after suitably delineating what the phenomena of rule-following involves, Dispositionism can solve the error and finite problems, but is unable to address the normativity problem, which has to do with reason-giving from the first-person perspective.