| Summary: | 碩士 === 國立雲林科技大學 === 財務金融系碩士班 === 94 === This paper build a model with the view of “corporate governance mechanisms” and uses it to investigate how to minimize the status the manager scooping out the firm’s assets. Our results described as follows.
First, while the manager scoops out the firm’s assets, firm idiosyncratic shock volatility is viewed as a risk cost for payoff. As the risk cost increased the scooping behavior of manager decreases. The most appropriate mechanism is taken by how the risk cost.
Second, firms should choose incentives system rather than enhance any supervised mechanisms if monitoring is costly.
Third, assuming that the manager is risk averse, than her fixed payoff will become more and more, accompanying idiosyncratic shock volatility to compensate manger for facing the risk.
Finally, we face a variety of economic development, politics, culture, law and society values. As William Pounds:“corporate governance is no standard answer”, we need to know a great deal more about these questions to adjustment the corporate governance.
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