| Summary: | 碩士 === 國立陽明大學 === 神經科學研究所 === 94 === Abstract
In search of the nature of consciousness has been a central issue in the area of philosophy of mind and psychology since a long time ago. In particular, perceptual consciousness becomes the most advancing field because of its tractability for scientific study and its unique features that are philosophically significant.
There are many theories about perception. However, in this essay I will mainly put focus on the enactive theory recently proposed by Hurley, Noë, and O’Regan. Motivations and reasons to concentrate on the enactive theory are its radicalness, novelty and experimental implications. Firstly, the enactive theorists try to argue for vehicle externalism by explaining how the sensorimotor relations between sensory input and motor output play the constitutive role in perceptual consciousness. Secondly, the enactive theory raises new issues against the common view that treats action and perception separately. In the empirical aspect, the enactive theory suggests that we have to consider the bodily activity and its relation to the brain in order to understand perception.
There are three major elements in the enactive theory. The first is a general two-level view to perceptual consciousness. The second element is the sensorimotor knowledge and sensorimotor contingency. Thirdly, the whole causal process that perception depends is dynamic. This means that the whole causal process should be individuated within a certain time span rather than an atomic temporal slice.
In this meta-theoretical essay, on the one hand, I will try to defend the enactive theory against several challenges; on the other hand, some objections will be also posed. The main thesis of this essay is that the enactive theory could survive some objections; although it is still not a complete theory and has some difficulties must be dealt with.
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