The Relationships between Non-inside Director and Shareholder Wealth

• Main Authors: Yi-jyun Liao, 廖益君
• Other Authors: Woan-Yuh Jang
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2006
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/9554zy

碩士 === 國立臺灣科技大學 === 財務金融研究所 === 94 === The research mainly sets to throw the non-inside directors appointment impact on shareholder's wealth. First of all, we analyzed with Logistic regression which kind of characteristic company will appoint the non-inside directors, and further, adopted event studying and multiple regression model to examine the announcement effect of the non-inside directors. However, except that company's characteristic, we also explored that the identity (CEO、academic background) of the non-inside director impact on announcement effects. In the way of the non-insider appointment and company's characteristic, find as a result：（1）The appointees are more likely to replace outgoing directors of the same classification.（2）Companies with lower inside ownership are more likely to appoint independent directors, and then with high growth opportunities are more likely to appoint gray directors.（3）Outside CEOs are more likely to get directorship when their own firms’ size is smaller and performance is better. In the way of the announcement effect, find as a result：（1）The various specialities of director appointment are differently impact on the shareholder's wealth, especially when appointments of CEOs as non-inside directors, it have positive announcement effects. In addition, the background of independent director, controlled in the estimation by the inclusion of both an MBA and a science degree indicator, are positively associated with the shareholder's wealth.（2）Companies with high inside and institutional ownership, small size or better performance are positively impact on the announcement effect of the non-inside director appointment.