| Summary: | 博士 === 國立臺灣大學 === 經濟學研究所 === 94 === The game with strategic complementarities can lead to multiple equilibria, and an equilibrium shifts from one to another not because something happened to the payoff structure but because all players believe the equilibrium changed. The trouble with indeterminate equilibrium is that the movement of the equilibrium is completely arbitrary. To overcome that problem, global games use the incomplete information to select equilibrium. Under a global game, some kind of noise intrudes into a game involving strategic complements. Due to the noise, information is incomplete: some component of the payoff is randomly determined and no player can observe the true state of the payoff. Therefore, this player will make the decision based on his/her own signal, and there will be unique equilibrium in a model with global game. The purpose of this dissertation is to provide alternative models with global game.
Chapter 2 considers the macroeconomic equilibrium to specify the government''s objectives of the currency crisis global game model and uses the specific government''s objectives to obtain the range of the true fundamental for the transparency policy that is decided by the government. It is shown that an information event might be a trigger for a currency attack, and the government will prevent a crisis by choosing transparency based on the transparency cost being small enough only.
In chapter 3, we add noise to the coordination failure model. It is shown that an information event can precipitate an economic fluctuation. Furthermore, we define the social welfare and use the specific social welfare to obtain the range of the economic state for the transparency policy that is decided by the government.
Chapter 4 sets up an incomplete information model of social norms. By using this model with the noisy signals, we show that it will become difficult to identify the norm-breakers (or norm-followers) due to the fact that there are insufficient social interactions. When the norm-induced motivation is vague, the cost of deviation from the norm, on the one hand, becomes evadable and, on the other hand, it becomes difficult for socially-minded individuals to “mimic” the decisions of other agents. Once the noisy signal effect becomes substantially large, the social norm-induced herd behavior will be jeopardized. As a result, the existence of a multiplicity of equilibria, which is a common result in a standard social norm model, may be eliminated.
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