The Research of DRAM Industry Strategy Coopetition--Case study of Infineon and Nanya

碩士 === 國立臺灣大學 === 會計學研究所 === 94 === Abstract As the global DRAM market gradually dominated by five major groups: Samsung, Infineon, Hynix, Micron and Elpida, the DRAM industry seems more stable and predictable. In this industry, Taiwanese DRAM makers take advantages on low-cost manufacturing and fin...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Shou-Yi Tseng, 曾守億
Other Authors: 郭震坤
Format: Others
Language:zh-TW
Published: 2006
Online Access:http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/86138818218601600236
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Summary:碩士 === 國立臺灣大學 === 會計學研究所 === 94 === Abstract As the global DRAM market gradually dominated by five major groups: Samsung, Infineon, Hynix, Micron and Elpida, the DRAM industry seems more stable and predictable. In this industry, Taiwanese DRAM makers take advantages on low-cost manufacturing and fine financial planning in its cooperation with the five major groups, basically through technology licensing or strategic alliance. In the DRAM trench alliance, current technology leader, Infineon, would be forced to sell her DRAM department to avoid the continuing losses. Whatever strategy Infineon may take will affect her close partner, Nanya. In the end, Nanya will face a decision point due to Infineon’s strategy. As Infineon takes “IPO” or “Sell in low price” to deal with her DRAM department, what would Nanya do? The interaction between them will have extensive impacts on the global DRAM market. This thesis is aimed to analyze the strategical interaction between Infineon and Nanya, and further assess the impact of their strategies to the global DRAM market. To deal with these problems, this thesis uses the “Nash bargaining solution” (NBS) and “Dynamic game” to analyze the strategical interaction between Infineon and Nanya, and find the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) of the dynamic game between Infineon and Nanya. Further, the “NPV & Sensitivity analysis” is used to assess if the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium is feasible. Based on the results of the study, this thesis obtains two conclusions in two scenarios. One scenario is that Infineon would defend her DRAM market. In this scenario, the SPNE is that Infineon would take IPO, and Nanya would have status quo. The other scenario is that Infineon would withdraw from her DRAM market. In this scenario, the SPNE is that Infineon would sell her DRAM department in low price, and Nanya would choose to merge it. Finally, using the “NPV & Sensitivity analysis”, this thesis concludes that Infineon would tend to IPO because Infineon could keep the leadership in trench technology alliance and then expand her DRAM market share instead of withdrawing from the DRAM market. Keyword: DRAM, Nash Bargaining Solution(NBS), Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) and, Dynamic game, Net Present Value(NPV) & Sensitivity analysis