A contract design to coordinate didital content provider and hardware supplier

碩士 === 國立臺灣大學 === 商學研究所 === 94 === Abstract With the progress of information technology and the trend of digitalization, various digital contents and compatible players are emerging. Excellent sales for both digital content provider and player manufacturer are dependent on superior quality, service...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Bing-Jyun Hsieh, 謝秉均
Other Authors: 蔣明晃
Format: Others
Language:zh-TW
Published: 2006
Online Access:http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/42056700892295740676
Description
Summary:碩士 === 國立臺灣大學 === 商學研究所 === 94 === Abstract With the progress of information technology and the trend of digitalization, various digital contents and compatible players are emerging. Excellent sales for both digital content provider and player manufacturer are dependent on superior quality, service and innovation of products provided by both content providers and hardware suppliers. However, in practice under the current contracts, hardware suppliers always pay a fixed fee for digital contents such that the hardware buyers have a right to download or buy them. This mechanism can not give a reasonable reward for the value created by content providers. Thus, the content providers simply make their decision based on profit maximization of themselves and don’t take manufacturers’ profit into account, which will lower the total profit of whole supply chain. In this thesis, we compare the revenue sharing contract and expense subsidy contract compared with current contract and hope to find a effective tool for the better coordination and higher profit of whole supply chain, content provider and hardware supplier. Firstly, three contract model under a set of given parameters are developed and solved by a non-linear programming to obtain the profit of whole supply chain. Next, the sensitive analysis of important parameters is performed to explore the impact of parameters’ change on the profits of content provider and hardware manufacturer. Also, the applicable scenario for each contract is identified. Finally, the results show that: 1. If profits sharing contract which is adopted by content providers will maximize the total profit of whole supply chain and keep both content provider and hardware supplier profitable. 2. When the cost of developing different type of content is high, revenue sharing contract is better; on the other hand, when the cost of developing different type of content is low, fixed fee contract is better.