| Summary: | 碩士 === 國立臺灣大學 === 政治學研究所 === 94 === In many cases of telecommunications deregulation, license issue is often conducted in two patterns: “Beauty Contest” or “Auction”, which were both put to use in Taiwan. In essence, the administration of Taiwan tends to appreciate the notion of telecommunications deregulation; however, a thorough evaluation on the process and effects of two license issuing methods is still to be needed. Accordingly, this study is aimed to provide an analysis on the two license issuing methods and how they affect the transaction cost between the license governors and the telecommunication service suppliers.
Based on the transaction cost approach in Williamson’s model, this study first determines the three types of the transaction cost involved in the license issuing process. The three types, which are “Negotiation Cost”, “Information Cost”, “Supervision-Compliance Cost”, will then be discussed in the license issuing cases of Japan, UK, and Taiwan. The results indicate that the administration tend to bear a higher “Negotiation Cost” and “Information Cost”, while having a lower “Supervision Cost” in “Beauty Contest” than in “Auction”. Service suppliers pay lower “Information Cost” and “Compliance Cost” in “Beauty Contest”. We believe, in this paper, impartiality is crucial in “Beauty Contest” method. If license issue is conducted in “Auction” method, a proper screening on the service suppliers before the bid could spare a great amount of “Supervision Cost” that may come along.
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