The Relationship between The Percentage of Independent Directors and Auditing Quality

碩士 === 國立臺北大學 === 會計學系 === 94 === The main purpose of this study is to assess the relationship between the percentage of independent directors and auditing quality. In recent years, there are several accounting fraud cases emerged, in order to rebuild investors’ confidence to the capital market and...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Ya-Fang Wang, 王雅芳
Other Authors: Jan-Zan Lee
Format: Others
Language:zh-TW
Published: 2006
Online Access:http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/75369465107478855144
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Summary:碩士 === 國立臺北大學 === 會計學系 === 94 === The main purpose of this study is to assess the relationship between the percentage of independent directors and auditing quality. In recent years, there are several accounting fraud cases emerged, in order to rebuild investors’ confidence to the capital market and raises the sincerity of enterprises, “Independent Directors and Supervisors” were introduced by Taiwan Stock Exchange corporation and Gre Tai Securities Market among February 2002. Researchers of various countries have not reached unanimous result on whether independent directors are truly independent from management. In an aspect of improving auditing quality, we look into whether independent directors and supervisors can fulfill their responsibility to strengthen the auditors’ independence in this study. Because the issuing of auditor’s opinion is affected by management, so in point 3, article 14, Securities and Exchange Law regulates that the assignment and dismissal or payment of auditors is determined by the board, and also the reserved or opposing opinion by the independent directors should be recorded on the board conference. In order to reveal certain information to the investors, regarding news were required to be disclosed publicly on the appointed web site. Therefore, the board is more independent when there is higher percentage of independent directors, and also more likely to mitigate such pressure by supporting the auditor in disputes with management, in a way to improve the auditing quality. The proxy variable of auditing quality in this study is whether the financially distressed companies receive going-concern report, while the independent variable is the percentage of independent directors and supervisors in the board. Regulated by Company Law, the board is responsible for supervising and execution while the supervisors supervise. To stabilize the result, we test the independent directors and supervisors separately, and examine the hypothesis with the logistic regression model. Results do not support percentage of independent directors and supervisors and improving of auditing quality.