A Study on the Incentive Wage System of the State-Owned Enterprises: In Case of Harbor Bureaucracies of Taiwan

• Main Authors: Hsin-Yung Ho, 賀欣勇
• Other Authors: Kee-Kuo Chen
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2006
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/24380814351213398318

碩士 === 國立臺灣海洋大學 === 航運管理學系 === 94 === The purpose of this thesis is offering a basic model to explain the agency problem, and using the model to find out the defect of incentive wage system of the state-owned enterprises. According to the “Theory of Corporate Governance” and “Theory of Collusion” we design a basic model to explain our question, and use the financial data of the harbor of Taiwan to prove our hypothesis. After this research, the problems of incentive wage system of the state-owned enterprises are: (1) the upper bound of bonus; (2) the net income will be influenced by unfavorable factor; (3) collusion. To prevent these problems, we suggest that: (1) the wage of accounting department should be independent of the operation member; (2) we should reconfirm the necessity about the upper bound of bonus; (3) the incentive wage system should not base on net income, because the net income can’t show the staff's real efforts.