| Summary: | 博士 === 國立中央大學 === 企業管理研究所 === 94 === The major purpose of this dissertation is to explore the impact of individual difference on the consumer behavior in selling prices and buying prices. We em-ploy the concept of social value orientation to probe this issue. Social value orien-tation is a relatively stable personality trait, which is distinct from people’s specific and variable preferences for outcome distributions. In the current research, we fo-cus on an empirically established typology that distinguishes among three orienta-tions: competitive, individualistic and prosocial. We argue that consumer behavior in prices setting is a kind of monetary outcomes setting. Sellers’ selling prices (Buyers’ buying prices) determine how much they could get (should loss), and how much prospective buyers (sellers) should pay (could get). Thus, the principle of this dissertation is to explore the varieties of decisions in selling prices and buying prices among competitors, individualists and prosocials.
A 3 (social value orientation) × 2 (role: seller vs. buyer) analysis of variance is employed in the STDUY 1. The results indicate that competitors charge higher prices than individualists, whose selling prices in turn are higher than those of pro-socials. In the self-as-buyer condition, prosocials are more willing to pay higher prices than individualists, whose buying prices in turn are higher than those of competitors. The findings support that individual difference affects consumer de-cisions on the selling prices and buying prices. And, in the loss condition, the preference for outcome distributions among three orientations is reversed. The STUDY 1 is also to examine the role of social value orientation on the endowment effect. The results also indicate that the magnitude of endowment effect is greater for competitors than that for individualists, whose magnitude in turn is greater than that for prosocials.
The purpose of the STUDY 2 is to probe the decisions in selling prices among three orientations when individuals face the multiple reference prices. The results show that individuals charge significantly lower price if the buyer is a friend rather than an unknown person for each orientation. And, competitors' selling prices is higher than those of individualists, and whose asking prices in turn is higher than those of prosocials, when they face the multiple reference prices. In addition, the indirect evidence support that individualists are more concern the realization of out-comes than competitors.
The principle of STUDY 3 is to examine the influence of asymmetric infor-mation on the selling prices. The findings illustrate that the self-interest motiva-tion derive competitors and individualists to decide higher selling prices under asymmetric information condition. Participants with prosocial orientation are not affected by the manipulation of information.
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