| Summary: | 碩士 === 國立成功大學 === 會計學系碩博士班 === 94 === Prior research has sought to detect earnings management by using accrual measures as proxies for managerial discretion. A few research seeks has sought to detect earning management by using special account or using homogeneous samples. Prior research also indicates that disclosures of valuation allowance changes can convey information to investors. Managers can also use the discretion available in setting valuation allowance to manage reported earnings. In this paper we use valueation allowance of DTA as proxies for managerial discretion and broad samples to examine whether valuation allowance of DTA can be use to anticipatory income smoothing、current income smoothing and signaling. We find evidence whether income smoothing and signaling are co-existing and convey different information to investors.
We use Defond and Park（1997）、Kanagaretnam et al.（2003、2004）、Frank and Rego（2006）empirical model. Based on job-security、risk and information-asymmetry incentives, we examine whether valuation allowance of DTA can be use to anticipatory income smoothing、current income smoothing and signaling. Our empirical results indicate that：（1）under job-security incentive, valueation allowance of DTA can not be use to anticipatory income smoothing, but we separate valueation allowance of DTA into discretionary and nondiscretionary. We can find discretionary valueation allowance of DTA can be use to anticipatory income smoothing. （2）under risk incentive, company with current income smoothing incentive, valueation allowance of DTA can not be use to anticipatory income smoothing. Company without current income smoothing incentive, valueation allowance of DTA can not be use to anticipatory income smoothing. （3）under information-asymmetry incentive, when company is undervalued, valueation allowance of DTA can be use to signaling. When company is overvalued, valueation allowance of DTA can not be use to signaling. （4）we joint test「current income smoothing」 and 「signaling」, with「current income smoothing」 and 「signaling」incentives, only with 「signaling」incentive, without 「current income smoothing」 and 「signaling」incentives. In these samples our empirical results are identical with Kanagaretnam et al.（2004）. But in only with 「current income smoothing」 incentives samples, our empirical results are not identical with Kanagaretnam et al.（2004）. Because loan loss provision and valueation allowance of DTA are different in nature and discretionary of loan loss provision and valueation allowance of DTA are different within GAAP.
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