| Summary: | 碩士 === 國立成功大學 === 會計學系碩博士班 === 94 === As the security market becomes rising and flourishing, the values of firms are not easily reacting from financial statements. And this results in information asymmetry between management and investors.
According to agency theory, if the managements do not disclose the information of firms in other manners, the investors have to increase the agency cost to understand the firms. Recently, most firms do the voluntary disclosures in other manners. In 1991, the Securities and Futures Bureau (SFB) requested the Publicly Listed Companies to do voluntary disclosures. Since Asian financial meltdown in 1997, more and more Publicly Listed Companies adjust their financial forecast downward. Because the investors are not notified, it resulted in their losses and many problems in the stock market. It also included that controlling shareholders manipulated the stock price by using the information of financial forecast. Financial forecasts revise enormously on account of external environment changing fiercely; even affect the investors’ participation in stock market. The investors will make allowances for it, after all we cannot know everything in advanced. But too many evidences show that the Publicly Listed Companies adjust their financial forecast downward, such as great profit becomes losses or losses turn into profit in a very short time. Therefore Taiwan Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC) repeal of the regulation of Publicly Listed Companies prepare financial forecast to avoid they raising stock price. From 2005, financial forecast is not longer compulsory to disclose, but voluntarily disclose.
This paper first discuss if the announcement of financial forecast will make the stock price abnormally fluctuate. This paper use event study methods to examine the information content of financial forecast and the effect on stock price for firms which listed on TSE & OTC. The period of data collection is 2005. Second, aimed at the styles of corporate governance and the difference of whether voluntary financial forecasts are announced or not to test to the difference of financial forecast under different types to inference the difference of information content.
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