The Impact of Corporate Governance on Firm Value: The Case of SARS Event in Taiwan

• Main Authors: Sunny-Wan-Ling Huang, 黃婉玲
• Other Authors: Shao-Chi Chang
• Format: Others
• Language: en_US
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/62522537018646522222

碩士 === 國立成功大學 === 國際管理碩士在職專班 === 94 === 　Corporate governance differs in different capitalistic countries and has very impor-tant significances for a company management. It is said that corporation always aspires to maximize its value. The issue, however, is that structural conflicts inherent inside the large-scale corporations bring about many difficult corporate governance problems. 　Many foreign studies showed that corporate governance has created a great deal of attention on many empirical financial crises over the whole world, such as the bankruptcy of Enron. Corporation, WorldCom and AOL. Besides, a research with sample of 398 firms from East Asia in 1997, the firm-level difference in variables related to corporate governance had a strong impact on firm performance during the East Asian financial cri-sis of 1997-1998. However, there are few studies about corporate governance while the unexpected crisis happened, especially in Taiwan. 　In this paper, we examine if difference in corporate governance at the firm level can explain difference in firm performance during the SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syn-drome) crisis. We use stock return over the crisis period as a signal for measuring firm performance in Taiwan’s listed companies. In this study, we make many variables, such as monitoring from international institution shareholder, ownership structure and so on, to control for factors that could affect firm performance. 　Significantly, better stock price performance of Taiwan’s listed companies is associ-ated with firms that had indicators that firms have outside ownership concentration, and with firms that were monitored by institutional shareholders. The results suggest that individual firms have some power to predict expropriation of minority shareholder if le-gal protection is inadequate.