Investment in China and Investor Protection: The evidence of US International Fund

碩士 === 國立成功大學 === 財務金融研究所 === 94 ===   The aim of this study is to survey how US international mutual fund managers allocate their assets when they strive to profit from investing in Great China Economic Entity (GCEE) and investigate whether corporate governance influences the managers’ selection of...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Chung-Chih Hsu, 徐崇智
Other Authors: Yenn-Ru Chen
Format: Others
Language:en_US
Published: 2006
Online Access:http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/65331285642191249868
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Summary:碩士 === 國立成功大學 === 財務金融研究所 === 94 ===   The aim of this study is to survey how US international mutual fund managers allocate their assets when they strive to profit from investing in Great China Economic Entity (GCEE) and investigate whether corporate governance influences the managers’ selection of stocks. We define GCEE regions as China, Hong Kong and Taiwan. The survey shows that their major preference is US local stocks and they are unwilling to invest directly in GCEE stock market. Better investor protection and home bias can explain this phenomenon.     As the result of the rarity of investment in GCEE stock market, we concentrate on US domestic stocks and classify them as US Asia-concept stocks and other US non-Asia -concept stocks to examine whether mutual fund managers will tend to indirectly invest in GCEE by means of US Asia-concept stocks. Average Institutional Holdings (AIH) and Aggregated Institutional Ownership (AIO) are used to proxy mutual fund holdings.    The AIH evidence shows US Asia-concept stocks are the managers’ preference and they overweigh firms with higher efficient board, less independent directors and less insider ownership. Furthermore, better performance, lower leverage, larger size of firm and higher risky investment are positively related to AIH and AIO. In terms of dividend policy, high dividend yield stocks are their liking. However, the AIO results manifest corporate governance has no significantly explanatory power.