| Summary: | 碩士 === 國立中興大學 === 國際政治研究所 === 94 === In October 2002, in the meeting with James Kelly, the former United States Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Kang Sok-Ju, North Korea’s First Vice Foreign Minister, confessed the existence of the clandestine highly enriched uranium (HEU) program in Pyongyang, the second North Korean nuclear crisis was ignited. Thereafter, Pyongyang has taken a series of brinksmanship strategies that escalated the tension between North Korea and the United States. Unlike dealing with Iraq crisis, the Bush administration kept a low profile this time. Although the U.S. did make efforts persuading North Korea to abandoning their nuclear weapon program afterwards, North Korea never ceased this program.
In the perspective of power theory, this thesis will inspect how the U.S. policy reacts to the second North Korean nuclear crisis from coercion, non-coercion, and exchange means. The effects of theses means will then be evaluated by four variables: communication, capability, creditability, and North Korea’s will. In the conclusion, the possible development and future trend of the U.S. policy will be assessed. Weakness and possible issues of the U.S. policy will also be indicated. Hence, my argument brings about that U.S.’s power is with limitation. Although U.S. relatively is more powerful than North Korea, U.S. still has plenty of difficulties to overcome on the second North Korean nuclear crisis.
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