The Analysis of Optimal Tariff on the Consideration of Environment Protection and Different Preferential Trade Agreements

碩士 === 大葉大學 === 事業經營研究所 === 94 === High development of global economy causes the transboundary pollution. The regional trade agreement prevails at the moment, this paper extends north and south trade models of the two-country, various-good by Copeland and Taylor(1995), set up a oligopoly model of th...

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Main Authors: CHEN CHENG LIANG, 陳政良
Other Authors: 楊維娟
Format: Others
Language:zh-TW
Published: 2006
Online Access:http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/28190272691292560193
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spelling ndltd-TW-094DYU001630172015-10-13T10:38:06Z http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/28190272691292560193 The Analysis of Optimal Tariff on the Consideration of Environment Protection and Different Preferential Trade Agreements 考慮環境品質與不同優惠貿易協議下之最適關稅分析 CHEN CHENG LIANG 陳政良 碩士 大葉大學 事業經營研究所 94 High development of global economy causes the transboundary pollution. The regional trade agreement prevails at the moment, this paper extends north and south trade models of the two-country, various-good by Copeland and Taylor(1995), set up a oligopoly model of three-country, two-firm and adopt the trade structure of the third market. This thesis aims to examine the host country adopt the different alliance strategic(free to levy a tax, most favored nation treatment, free trade area) with a developed and undeveloped country on the consideration of environment protection, the influence of optimal tariff, level of output and social welfare, respectively. This paper adopt two kinds of extreme situations of pollution tax to tend to zero or infinite for the convenience of analysis that in the social welfare. We obtains the following conclusions: When pollution tax to tend to zero, the meaning of free to levy a tax and most favored nation, and the social welfare is the same. The meaning of free trade with B or C-country, and the social welfare is the same. When the host country’s government levies tax to two countries at the same time, the limited degree is relatively little, so the host country’s social welfare is relatively high. When pollution tax to tend to infinite, the host country's policy is unrestricted and make the social welfare reach highest in the situation of free to levy a tax; Average while levying tax freely that the tariff will be ordered, the host country’s policy is restricted at present, and social welfare will be reduced gradually in the situation of most favored nation treatment. When host country adopt free trade with C country that the limited degree is the greatest, so the host country’s social welfare will reach the minimum level. 楊維娟 2006 學位論文 ; thesis 47 zh-TW
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description 碩士 === 大葉大學 === 事業經營研究所 === 94 === High development of global economy causes the transboundary pollution. The regional trade agreement prevails at the moment, this paper extends north and south trade models of the two-country, various-good by Copeland and Taylor(1995), set up a oligopoly model of three-country, two-firm and adopt the trade structure of the third market. This thesis aims to examine the host country adopt the different alliance strategic(free to levy a tax, most favored nation treatment, free trade area) with a developed and undeveloped country on the consideration of environment protection, the influence of optimal tariff, level of output and social welfare, respectively. This paper adopt two kinds of extreme situations of pollution tax to tend to zero or infinite for the convenience of analysis that in the social welfare. We obtains the following conclusions: When pollution tax to tend to zero, the meaning of free to levy a tax and most favored nation, and the social welfare is the same. The meaning of free trade with B or C-country, and the social welfare is the same. When the host country’s government levies tax to two countries at the same time, the limited degree is relatively little, so the host country’s social welfare is relatively high. When pollution tax to tend to infinite, the host country's policy is unrestricted and make the social welfare reach highest in the situation of free to levy a tax; Average while levying tax freely that the tariff will be ordered, the host country’s policy is restricted at present, and social welfare will be reduced gradually in the situation of most favored nation treatment. When host country adopt free trade with C country that the limited degree is the greatest, so the host country’s social welfare will reach the minimum level.
author2 楊維娟
author_facet 楊維娟
CHEN CHENG LIANG
陳政良
author CHEN CHENG LIANG
陳政良
spellingShingle CHEN CHENG LIANG
陳政良
The Analysis of Optimal Tariff on the Consideration of Environment Protection and Different Preferential Trade Agreements
author_sort CHEN CHENG LIANG
title The Analysis of Optimal Tariff on the Consideration of Environment Protection and Different Preferential Trade Agreements
title_short The Analysis of Optimal Tariff on the Consideration of Environment Protection and Different Preferential Trade Agreements
title_full The Analysis of Optimal Tariff on the Consideration of Environment Protection and Different Preferential Trade Agreements
title_fullStr The Analysis of Optimal Tariff on the Consideration of Environment Protection and Different Preferential Trade Agreements
title_full_unstemmed The Analysis of Optimal Tariff on the Consideration of Environment Protection and Different Preferential Trade Agreements
title_sort analysis of optimal tariff on the consideration of environment protection and different preferential trade agreements
publishDate 2006
url http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/28190272691292560193
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