Defensive Techniques and Corporate Control

碩士 === 元智大學 === 財務金融研究所 === 93 === This paper analyzes a sample of firms experiencing proxy contests for seats on their board of directors in the 1988-2004 period. Even if cash-rich firms are more likely to become the targets of proxy contests. In our opinion, the takeover-deterrence effects of exce...

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Main Authors: Chia-Szu Huang, 黃家思
Other Authors: Yang-Pin Shen
Format: Others
Language:en_US
Published: 2005
Online Access:http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/21808016917426349517
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spelling ndltd-TW-093YZU003040222016-06-10T04:15:25Z http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/21808016917426349517 Defensive Techniques and Corporate Control 探討公司採取抵抗措施與公司控制之關係 Chia-Szu Huang 黃家思 碩士 元智大學 財務金融研究所 93 This paper analyzes a sample of firms experiencing proxy contests for seats on their board of directors in the 1988-2004 period. Even if cash-rich firms are more likely to become the targets of proxy contests. In our opinion, the takeover-deterrence effects of excess cash may be an important variable which could influence the results of proxy contests. We find that the result of proxy contest which dissident victory holds more cash than management victory, and REPO Variable (directly affects the outcome of proxy contests through its effect on the distribution of votes) is the most significant factor in increasing the probability of dissident success in proxy contests. We also find that when the dissidents succeed in a proxy contest and it’s a cash-rich firm, abnormal returns following the proxy contest are significantly negative. This suggests that, in cases where dissidents win and with higher cash holding, the market has unrealistic expectations and investor overreaction around proxy contests. Yang-Pin Shen 沈仰斌 2005 學位論文 ; thesis 55 en_US
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language en_US
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description 碩士 === 元智大學 === 財務金融研究所 === 93 === This paper analyzes a sample of firms experiencing proxy contests for seats on their board of directors in the 1988-2004 period. Even if cash-rich firms are more likely to become the targets of proxy contests. In our opinion, the takeover-deterrence effects of excess cash may be an important variable which could influence the results of proxy contests. We find that the result of proxy contest which dissident victory holds more cash than management victory, and REPO Variable (directly affects the outcome of proxy contests through its effect on the distribution of votes) is the most significant factor in increasing the probability of dissident success in proxy contests. We also find that when the dissidents succeed in a proxy contest and it’s a cash-rich firm, abnormal returns following the proxy contest are significantly negative. This suggests that, in cases where dissidents win and with higher cash holding, the market has unrealistic expectations and investor overreaction around proxy contests.
author2 Yang-Pin Shen
author_facet Yang-Pin Shen
Chia-Szu Huang
黃家思
author Chia-Szu Huang
黃家思
spellingShingle Chia-Szu Huang
黃家思
Defensive Techniques and Corporate Control
author_sort Chia-Szu Huang
title Defensive Techniques and Corporate Control
title_short Defensive Techniques and Corporate Control
title_full Defensive Techniques and Corporate Control
title_fullStr Defensive Techniques and Corporate Control
title_full_unstemmed Defensive Techniques and Corporate Control
title_sort defensive techniques and corporate control
publishDate 2005
url http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/21808016917426349517
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