A Study on The Cross-Strait Relation under the Governance of Chen Shui-Bian (2000 - 2005)

• Main Authors: Hsieh, Hsien-Chih, 謝憲治
• Other Authors: 潘錫堂
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2005
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/79036952782143133328

碩士 === 淡江大學 === 中國大陸研究所碩士班 === 93 === This thesis starts at the analysis on President Chen Shui-Bian’s Cross-Strait Policy and his positioning on the two sides of the Strait. Besides, by reviewing the 7 meetings since the “Cross-Party Committee” was set up and the final “3 recognitions, 4 suggestions” this committee had reached, this thesis also tries to discuss how urgent Present Chen was to look forward to a consensus in principle on Cross-Strait Policy through the meetings of the “Cross-party committee.” Then is an analysis on what it meant, as well as how it effected, to the Cross-Strait economic and trade relation that the both sides across the Strait joined WTO separately in the end of 2001 and the beginning of 2002, and also on the changes of China’s policy toward Taiwan and Taiwan’s toward China. And even more, how the interaction between the two affected the US-China-Taiwan relation. Later in this thesis is to explain the changes and crisis on Cross-Strait relation since Taiwan’s Presidential Election in 2004: started by reviewing the crisis on the US-China-Taiwan relation during March 20th and May 20th, and then analysis how the US-China-Taiwan relation changed after May 20th through discussing how the events including Bush’s being re-elected the USA president, the meeting between Bush and Hu Jintao at APEC Summit, as well as China’s enacting and adopting the “Anti Secession Law” effected the US-China-Taiwan relation, and especially the significance of Rice’s, the USA Secretary of State, visiting Beijing after China had enacted the “Anti Secession Law”and the momentous effect it might caused. During the 5 years of his governance, President Chen Shui-Bian attempted to soften the intensive Cross-Strait relation by release his good will, but with no effect. The key point is Chen’s statement about the two sides. Though insisting “Five Nos” literally, he denied “1992 Consensus” once and again. More over, his related statements, from “a consensus without a consensus,” “1992 spirit,” to “one side, one country,” are eventually against the “Five Nos.” Even he devoted to seek for a consensus in principle among the ruling and the opposition parties on Cross-Strait Policy, the consensus reached by the “Cross-Party Committee” are still unable to decrease the differences between the ruling party and the opposition ones. Therefore, the Cross-Strait relation remains a stalemate and can hardly be broken through reopening the dialog between the two sides. On the other hand, the opposition parties and the ruling one contravene each other so sharply that can hardly be soothed by getting a consensus toward the Cross-Strait policy, not to say pacified. As a result, issues concerning the well beings of people, such as “3 direct links” and “Cross-Strait cooperation in cracking down crimes,” are still suspended and can not get a settlement through resuming the Cross-Strait dialogue. Then, after China enacted and adopted the “Anti Secession Law,” the Cross-Strait relation, and even the US-China-Taiwan relation, faced more severe tests and challenges.