Theory Choice: A Rationalistic Interpretation and Defense

• Main Authors: Tai, Dong-Yuan, 戴東源
• Other Authors: Yuann, Jeu-Jenq
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2005
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/25726757125610473573

博士 === 東海大學 === 哲學系 === 93 === The aim of this dissertation is to offer an account of the rationality of theory choice. The central question in this issue is: how and why we accept or reject a theory? In this dissertation, I claim that most scientists make their choice of theories in accordance with some nearly general criteria (such as methods, norms, etc.) when they are in the situation of theory choice. With regard to my claim, there are traditionally two research approaches: Rationalism and Pragmatism. Rationalism mainly represented by Logical Positivists and Popper who consider science from logically analytic perspective. They hold that scientific methodology is a priori and the explanation of theory choice or theory change must be normative and objective. Pragmatists including Hanson, Kuhn, Feyerabend and many sociologists of knowledge challenge rationalism with a sociological and psychological view of scientific knowledge. With this view, they claim that there is no universal methodology for theory choice. At times, the pragmatists go even further leading ahead to relativism by entirely denying the rationality and objectivity of science. In this dissertation I criticize this position of relativism, examine the fault of traditional rationalism and propose a moderate rationalistic position. My argument consists of three aspects. First, I show the failure of pragmatists’ attacks on rationalistic notion about scientific observation, theory, and method. The sociological-psychological approach of scientific knowledge faces difficulties. Secondly, opposing to a priori methodological view held by traditional rationalists, I argue that methodological enterprise is an empirical research which has to take into account the history of science. Thirdly, I propose a sort of “moderate rationalism” which holds some accepted criteria as the methodological cores of theory choice. These criteria would be further developed to methodological rules (or methods) as tentative norms in scientific practice if we carry out a closer look at the history of science.